<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?><rss version="2.0"><channel><title>Blog</title><description><![CDATA[BlogMapProvider]]></description><link>http://louis-j-sheehan.net/Blog/page1.aspx</link><language>en-us</language><generator>Parallels Plesk Sitebuilder 4.5 for Windows (Blog module v4.5.221.27483)</generator><item><title>Crytosystems   33.cry.0003   Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire</title><pubDate>Monday, 28 December 2009 04:51:33</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<p>Much of the theoretical work in cryptography concerns <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_primitive" title="Cryptographic primitive">cryptographic <em>primitives</em></a>
— algorithms with basic cryptographic properties — and their
relationship to other cryptographic problems. More complicated
cryptographic tools are then built from these basic primitives. These
primitives provide fundamental properties, which are used to develop
more complex tools called <em><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptography#Cryptosystems" title="Cryptography">cryptosystems</a></em> or <em>cryptographic protocols</em>, which guarantee one or more high-level security properties. Note however, that the distinction between cryptographic <em>primitives</em> and cryptosystems, is quite arbitrary; for example, the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA" title="RSA">RSA</a>
algorithm is sometimes considered a cryptosystem, and sometimes a
primitive. Typical examples of cryptographic primitives include <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pseudorandom_function" title="Pseudorandom function" class="mw-redirect">pseudorandom functions</a>, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-way_function" title="One-way function">one-way functions</a>, etc.<span class="editsection"></span></p><p><span class="editsection"></span><span class="mw-headline" id="Cryptosystems">Cryptosystems</span></p>

<p>One or more cryptographic primitives are often used to develop a more complex algorithm, called a cryptographic system, or <em>cryptosystem</em>. Cryptosystems (e.g. <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ElGamal_encryption" title="ElGamal encryption">El-Gamal encryption</a>)
are designed to provide particular functionality (e.g. public key
encryption) while guaranteeing certain security properties (e.g. <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chosen-plaintext_attack" title="Chosen-plaintext attack">CPA</a> security in the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Random_oracle_model" title="Random oracle model" class="mw-redirect">random oracle model</a>).
Cryptosystems use the properties of the underlying cryptographic
primitives to support the system's security properties. Of course, as
the distinction between primitives and cryptosystems is somewhat
arbitrary, a sophisticated cryptosystem can be derived from a
combination of several more primitive cryptosystems. In many cases, the
cryptosystem's structure involves back and forth communication among
two or more parties in space (e.g., between the sender of a secure
message and its receiver) or across time (e.g., cryptographically
protected <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backup" title="Backup">backup</a> data). Such cryptosystems are sometimes called <em><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_protocol" title="Cryptographic protocol">cryptographic protocols</a></em>.</p>
<p>Some widely known cryptosystems include <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA" title="RSA">RSA encryption</a>, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schnorr_signature" title="Schnorr signature">Schnorr signature</a>, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ElGamal_encryption" title="ElGamal encryption">El-Gamal encryption</a>, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy" title="Pretty Good Privacy">PGP</a>, etc. More complex cryptosystems include <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_cash" title="Electronic cash" class="mw-redirect">electronic cash</a><sup id="cite_ref-24" class="reference"><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptography#cite_note-24"><span>[</span>25<span>]</span></a></sup> systems, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signcryption" title="Signcryption">signcryption</a> systems, etc. Some more 'theoretical' cryptosystems include <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interactive_proof_system" title="Interactive proof system">interactive proof systems</a>,<sup id="cite_ref-25" class="reference"><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptography#cite_note-25"><span>[</span>26<span>]</span></a></sup> (like <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-knowledge_proof" title="Zero-knowledge proof">zero-knowledge proofs</a>,<sup id="cite_ref-26" class="reference"><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptography#cite_note-26"><span>[</span>27<span>]</span></a></sup>), systems for <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secret_sharing" title="Secret sharing">secret sharing</a><sup id="cite_ref-27" class="reference"><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptography#cite_note-27"><span></span><span></span></a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-28" class="reference"><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptography#cite_note-28"><span></span><span></span></a></sup>, etc.</p>
<p>Until recently, most security properties of most cryptosystems were
demonstrated using empirical techniques, or using ad hoc reasoning.
Recently, there has been considerable effort to develop formal
techniques for establishing the security of cryptosystems; this has
been generally called <em><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provable_security" title="Provable security">provable security</a></em>.
The general idea of provable security is to give arguments about the
computational difficulty needed to compromise some security aspect of
the cryptosystem (ie, to any adversary).</p>
<p>The study of how best to implement and integrate cryptography in software applications is itself a distinct field, see: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_engineering" title="Cryptographic engineering">cryptographic engineering</a> and <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_engineering" title="Security engineering">security engineering</a>.&nbsp; Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire<br></p><br/><table cellpadding="5" cellspacing="0" border="0" width="100%"><tr><td><a href="http://louis-j-sheehan.net/Blog/page1/2009/12/28/a7b0430e-c69f-4b90-8354-7a16a4ee2692.aspx">Comments (0)</a></td></tr></table>]]></description><link>http://louis-j-sheehan.net/Blog/page1/2009/12/28/a7b0430e-c69f-4b90-8354-7a16a4ee2692.aspx</link><guid isPermaLink="true">http://louis-j-sheehan.net/Blog/page1/2009/12/28/a7b0430e-c69f-4b90-8354-7a16a4ee2692.aspx</guid></item><item><title>discounted   4.dis.0003   Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire</title><pubDate>Friday, 18 December 2009 06:39:00</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<span>n his very thorough book on the case, <em>Helter Skelter</em>,
Prosecutor Vincent Bugliosi heaps a great deal of fault upon the
homicide detectives of the Los Angeles Police Department. One of the
examples he provides is the LAPD's slowness to connect the Tate murders
with the LaBianca murders the following night and with the murder of
Gary Hinman a few days earlier. Some of this fault on the part of the
LAPD apparently stemmed from its lack of cooperation with the Los
Angeles County Sheriff's Office.</span><p><span><div class="image_flr"><img src="http://i.cdn.turner.com/trutv/trutv.com/graphics/photos/serial_killers/notorious/manson/3a.jpg" alt="Victim Gary Hinman"><div class="image_caption">Victim Gary Hinman</div></div></span></p><p><span>The
LAPD was approached shortly after the Tate-LaBianca murders by&nbsp;two LA
Sheriff's Office detectives who told them of the July 31 murder of
music teacher Gary Hinman. On the wall of the dead man's living room
was written in his own blood "POLITICAL PIGGY," which seemed very
similar to the words written at both the Tate and the LaBianca crimes
scenes. Also, Hinman had been stabbed to death as had victims at the
Tate and LaBianca homes.</span></p><p><span>Amazingly enough, the LAPD
detectives refused to examine any connection between the deaths of
Hinman and the people at the Tate house. Furthermore, the LaBianca
murders were squarely in the territory of the LA Sheriff's Office and
the LAPD had no interest.</span></p><p><span><div class="image_flr"><img src="http://i.cdn.turner.com/trutv/trutv.com/graphics/photos/serial_killers/notorious/manson/3b.jpg" alt="Bobby Beausoleil "><div class="image_caption">Bobby Beausoleil </div></div></span></p><p><span>Had
the LAPD detectives bothered to listen to the LA Sheriff's Office
detectives, they would have heard that the Sheriff's Office had
arrested a Bobby Beausoleil for the Hinman murder. A Beausoleil&nbsp;who had
been&nbsp;living with a bunch of hippies led by Charles Manson. But, the
LAPD had already decided that the Tate murders were a result of a drug
deal gone bad and didn't want to hear about any hippies.</span></p><p><span>On
the other hand, the LAPD had in custody one William Garretson, the
caretaker on the Tate estate who claimed that he slept through the
entire bloody ordeal. The case against the frightened young man never
materialized after he passed a polygraph test.</span></p><p><span>Officials
essentially discounted robbery as a motive for the crimes, even though
Rosemary LaBianca's wallet and wristwatch were missing.&nbsp; In the two
homes of these affluent victims there were many items of value, which
had not been touched by the killers. Small amounts of cash lying around
the Tate home were still in evidence and the purses and wallets of the
Tate victims were intact.</span></p><p><span>The LAPD did investigate
three alleged dope dealers that had once crashed a party at the
Polanski's, but one by one the men were cleared of any involvement.</span></p><p><span>Likewise,
Roman Polanski was interviewed for hours by the police and agreed to a
polygraph examination. On August 15, he returned for the first time
since the murders to the house on Cielo Drive, accompanied by psychic
Peter Hurkos.</span></p><p><span>Polanski had been devastated by the
loss of his wife and son and was enraged at the media circus that he
walked into when he got back to the States. He lashed out at the
newspapers for suggesting that he and his wife were Satanists,
indulging in sex and drug orgies. "Sharon," he said, "was so sweet and
so lovely that I didn't believe that people like that existed...She was
beautiful without phoniness. She was fantastic. She loved me and the
last few years I Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire spent with her were the only time of true happiness in
my life..."</span></p><p><span>He worried to the police that perhaps he
was the target not Sharon. "It could be some kind of jealousy or plot
or something. It couldn't be Sharon directly." Polanski did not believe
that drugs were a motive for the crimes. His wife, although she had
experimented with LSD before they met, was not a big drug user. "I can
tell you without question," he told the police. "She took no drugs at
all, except for pot, and not too much of that. And during her pregnancy
there was no question, she was so in love with her pregnancy she would
do nothing. I'd pour a glass of wine and she wouldn't touch it."</span></p><p>&nbsp;</p><br/><table cellpadding="5" cellspacing="0" border="0" width="100%"><tr><td><a href="http://louis-j-sheehan.net/Blog/page1/2009/12/18/739a4b5b-5471-451b-8cea-9bee8e7c7b42.aspx">Comments (0)</a></td></tr></table>]]></description><link>http://louis-j-sheehan.net/Blog/page1/2009/12/18/739a4b5b-5471-451b-8cea-9bee8e7c7b42.aspx</link><guid isPermaLink="true">http://louis-j-sheehan.net/Blog/page1/2009/12/18/739a4b5b-5471-451b-8cea-9bee8e7c7b42.aspx</guid></item></channel></rss>